Underdetermination, methodological practices, and the case of John Snow by Tulodziecki, D.
Underdetermination, methodological practices,
and the case of John Snow∗†
D. Tulodziecki
Version 03/2009
Contents
1 Introduction 2
2 Underdetermination and the virtues 3
3 The reasoning of John Snow 5
3.1 Evidence I: General Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2 Evidence II: Snow’s Many Case-Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3 Water and the Broad Street pump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4 Snow and the traditional theoretical virtues . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4.1 Avoidance of ad hoc modifications . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4.2 Generation of novel predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4.3 Consilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4 The testability of epistemic significance 12
5 Objections 14
6 Underdetermination again 17
∗Draft of paper to be presented at the Underdetermination in Science Workshop (Pitts-
burgh, 21–22 March 2009). This paper is a shortened version of a longer draft and currently
still undergoing revisions; please do not cite without author’s permission.
†Many thanks to Philip Kitcher for discussions of an earlier version of this draft.
1
1 Introduction
One realist solution to underdetermination is an appeal to the idea that
there are criteria besides the empirical evidence that are supposed to have
epistemic import and break ties in underdetermination scenarios (most often
those going under the name of ‘theoretical virtues’). Despite widespread
appeal to such criteria, however, there has been little discussion of how to
generate a robust set of such criteria. In this paper, I want to make some
headway towards this goal.
After a brief discussion of underdetermination, the theoretical virtues, and
the approach that I will take in this paper (section 2), I will examine a case
in the history of medicine – that of the British physician John Snow and his
reasoning about the origin and pathology of cholera – and argue that Snow
used a variety of inferential and methodological practices that led him to
accept various hypotheses about cholera that could not be checked at the
time, and that none of his contemporaries accepted (section 3).
I will argue (in section 4) that this case-study suggests: (i) an expanded
conception of epistemic criteria besides the empirical evidence; in particular,
a conception that goes beyond the theoretical virtues so as to include certain
inferential and methodological practices, (ii) that many of these practices are,
in fact, epistemically significant, and (iii) that we can test for the success of
these practices empirically by examining case-studies in the history of science.
Specifically, I will offer my reconstruction of Snow’s reasoning about cholera
as a concrete example of the sort of empirical research that needs to be done
in order to discover what kinds of methodological rules and practices are
actually of epistemic interest – it is thus the first piece of data in support of
the approach outlined in this paper.
After discussing some (anti-realist) objections to this approach (section
5), I will explain how the case of Snow (and other cases like it) can help
us resolve specific cases of underdetermination (section 6). I will show that
this approach issues a new challenge to anti-realists, and argue that, even if
anti-realists can successfully diffuse the new objections I pose, they will at
most be able to do so in a piecemeal fashion, thus losing the much needed
guarantee that there will always be rival cases of the required kind.
2
2 Underdetermination and the virtues
One of the standard ways of formulating the underdetermination argument
is in terms of the following two theses:
1. Empirical Equivalence Thesis (following Kukla 1998, Psillos 1999): any
theory has empirically equivalent and logically incompatible rivals, and
2. Entailment Thesis (cf. Psillos 1999): entailment of the evidence is the
only epistemic constraint on theory-choice.
From these two theses it is inferred that belief in any one theory over its
rivals “must be arbitrary and unfounded” (Kukla 1998: 58). In this paper, I’ll
mainly be concerned with the second premise. Denying this premise amounts
to embracing the view that there can be criteria other than the empirical
evidence that can have an effect on a theory’s epistemic standing. Most often
this response is given in terms of the so-called theoretical virtues (simplicity,
elegance, unifying power, consilience, etc.) – criteria that are supposed to
raise a theory’s chances of being (approximately) true or successful. Here, for
example, is a typical realist take on the theoretical virtues from Churchland
(1985: 35):
I will maintain that observational excellence or ‘empirical adequacy’ is
only one epistemic virtue among others of equal or comparable impor-
tance [the virtues that Churchland cites later in the same paragraph
are simplicity, coherence, and explanatory power].
Here’s another from Psillos (1999: 171):
We also need to take into account several theoretical virtues such as
coherence with other established theories, consilience, completeness,
unifying power, lack of ad hoc features and capacity to generate novel
predictions.
Anti-realists, by contrast, think there is nothing epistemic about the virtues
at all. van Fraassen, for example, writes:
When a theory is advocated, it is praised for many features other
than empirical adequacy and strength: it is said to be mathematically
elegant, simple, of great scope, complete in certain respects: also of
wonderful use in unifying our account of hitherto disparate phenom-
ena, and most of all, explanatory. (1980: 87)
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He goes on:
Values of this sort, however, provide reasons for using a theory, or con-
templating it, whether or not we think it true, and cannot rationally
guide our epistemic attitudes and decisions. (87)
Thus, anti-realists hold that the virtues are only pragmatically interest-
ing. The trick for the realist, then, is to establish a connection between the
virtues and truth. Curiously, despite the fact that the virtues are often in-
voked by realists, there have been comparatively few attempts by realists to
spell out this alleged connection in any detail.1 In particular, there haven’t
been any real attempts to discuss and explain either (i) how exactly one
might go about establishing this connection, or (ii) how to generate a robust
set of virtues (that can that actually be used by realists to dispel alleged
underdetermination scenarios).
I think we can make some headway towards both, and we can do so by
examining the case of John Snow’s reasoning about the origin and pathology
of cholera from a certain perspective. Snow, by using a number of inferen-
tial and methodological practices, was led to accept a variety of (correct)
conclusions about cholera that could not be verified at the time, and that
his opponents rejected. I think his case suggests that we ought to expand
our conception of epistemic criteria besides the empirical evidence in a way
that goes beyond the theoretical virtues; in particular, in a way that includes
certain methodological principles and rules, such as the ones used by Snow.
Snow is explicit about the fact that he takes these principles to be of the
epistemic kind. Of course he could be mistaken (although I hope section 3
will show that he wasn’t). Nevertheless, however, this case allows us to catch
a glimpse of these principles ‘in action’, if you will, which is more than can
be said for some of the traditional theoretical virtues. What I hope the case
shows is that it will at the very least be both plausible and fruitful to include
them as potential candidates. In fact, I think the Snow case can do much
more than this – it doesn’t just suggest that we should extend our pool of
criteria, I think it actually suggests that some of his principles are epistem-
ically significant. After discussing the details of the case, I’ll show how we
can use it to make this argument more persuasively.
1Although there are some notable discussions of some of the individual virtues; see, for
example, Glymour (1985) on explanatory power, and also Kelly’s discussions of simplicity
(such as his recent (2007a) and (2007b)).
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A couple of provisos are in order here: First of all, I ought to stress that
the argument that follows in no way depends on the fact that Snow actually
used these principles. I happen to think that he was an excellent and careful
reasoner and that it’s no accident that he used the kinds of principles he did2
– but even if it had been, that would not undermine the argument of this
paper. What matters is that following certain principles in certain contexts
leads to certain conclusions; this can be tested (if need be, by thought ex-
periments) regardless of whether anyone actually happened to employ them
at a particular time. Secondly, one case, of course, isn’t enough to establish
the epistemic significance of anything. What exactly is required, and some of
the objections one might voice to this approach as a whole, will be explored
below.
3 The reasoning of John Snow
Neither Snow’s, nor his opponents’ claims could be verified prior to the dis-
covery of vibrio cholerae; there was simply no way of settling for good the
question of what exactly was causing cholera and how, or indeed if, it was
passed on. Snow actually inferred several different things about the disease;
however, for brevity, I will focus solely on his claim that cholera is communi-
cable. The rival theory to this claim was the miasma theory of disease, the
prevalent theory of cholera at the time. According to this theory, organic
matter decays, decomposes, and gives rise to new compounds that are given
off into the surrounding air and atmosphere – the miasmas. Inhaling these
miasmas was thought to be poisonous (decaying animal matter was thought
to be particularly toxic), and it was thought that the toxic ingredients acted
on the blood and disturbed the body’s balance. Depending on the specific lo-
cal conditions, such as location, season, humidity, barometric pressure, and
weather, people then contracted one of a variety of diseases (cholera, ty-
phoid fever, etc.). Who was afflicted, and the severity of the affliction would
in turn depend on a variety of personal dispositions, such as poor nutrition,
sickly constitution, bad hygiene, or, to cite some of the more interesting ones:
strong emotions, especially fear, and immorality, specifically overindulgence
in alcohol and sex. In fact, this was why it was thought that people were
more likely to contract diseases on the weekends, because there were more
2For what it’s worth, he didn’t just excel at reasoning about cholera; he was also a
pioneer in developing anaesthesia.
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opportunities for dissipation and debauchery. The main reason miasmatists
rejected Snow’s communicability hypothesis was that cholera was unlike the
classic contagious diseases, such as syphilis or smallpox. So why, with this
elaborate theory in place, did Snow come to the conclusion that cholera was
communicable?
3.1 Evidence I: General Considerations
One of the first things that Snow points out is that cholera always follows
“the great channels of human intercourse” (PMCC: 746)3, and that when
troops were attacked with cholera, it would often remain with them through
different countries and climates, and that it would often appear in villages
and towns that had been free from cholera until troops passed through. In
India, for example, cholera would spread along the main travel routes, but
pass over villages that were a little away from these routes. This was prob-
lematic for the miasma theory: if cholera weren’t communicable, and caused
only by miasmas, and the presence of miasmas, in turn, depended on factors
like geography and climate, then (i) cholera should disappear as soon as these
factors disappear, which was not the case, (ii) it couldn’t explain the correla-
tion between cholera and the troops, which were supposed to have nothing to
do at all with cholera, and (iii) one would expect it to be equally present in
areas that are sufficiently similar in climate and various other relevant con-
ditions, but there was no difference among the healthy and afflicted villages
in geography or weather – the only difference being the passing through of
troops.
This is an interesting piece of data, because it is one of the first instances in
which we see Snow using causal principles; Snow’s reasoning actually seems
3The references to Snow’s works are as follows: ‘MCC1’ refers to On the Mode of
Communication of Cholera, first edition, London: John Churchill, August 1849; ‘MCC2’
refers to On the Mode of Communication of Cholera (1855), second and much en-
larged edition; ‘PMCC’ refers to On the Pathology and Mode of Communication of
Cholera, London Medical Gazette, vol. 44, Nov. 2, 1849: 745–752/Nov. 30, 1849: 923–
929; ‘MPC’ refers to On the Mode of Propagation of Cholera, Medical Times 3, Nov.
29, 1851: 559–562/Dec. 6, 1851: 610–612. Since all these texts are out of print,
for the readers’ convenience, I have provided quotations from the online versions at
http : //www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow/principalwritings.html. Unfortunately, the text for
MCC2 omits Snow’s original page numbers; hence, the references I will provide will refer
to the divisions on this site (for example, ‘MCC2: 3’ indicates that a quotation was taken
from the third part of MCC2).
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to be based on something close to Mill’s Method of Difference:
If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs
and an instance in which it does not occur have every circumstance in
common save one, that one occurring only in the former, the circum-
stance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause,
or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon. (1843/1950:
215-216)4
This is a principle that Snow uses in a variety of contexts (see below);
here, however, he uses it to support the communicability hypothesis: the
only difference between the villages in which there was cholera and those in
which there wasn’t, was whether troops had passed through.
3.2 Evidence II: Snow’s Many Case-Studies
Besides general considerations of the above sort, Snow also appealed to a
number of cases in which people contracted cholera after having been in
contact with either someone sick or something that could be connected to
someone sick. Snow is very explicit about the fact that he considers these
cases to be of immense importance: “the most conclusive part of the evidence,
is the number of instances in which the malady has been introduced into
healthy localities by persons who have been taken ill after their arrival from
places where cholera prevailed” (MCP: 559a). Once again, the number of
Snow’s collected cases is overwhelming; however, here is an example that
is fairly typical: there was a completely healthy village about which it was
known that there was no cholera in an area covering a radius of 30 miles
around the village. Yet suddenly one of the villages labourers, 39-year-old
John Barnes, became violently ill after having suffered from cramps and
diarrhoea. He was diagnosed with cholera by a local doctor, but no one
knew how he might have contracted it. Barnes died the next day, and by
then there were a couple of more victims, Barnes’s wife, and two people who
had been to visit him the day before. And while the doctors were pondering
how the victims could have contracted cholera “the mystery was all at once,
and most unexpectedly, unravelled by the arrival in the village of the son
of the deceased John Barnes” (MCP: 559a). It turned out that the son was
an apprentice to his uncle in Leeds and that his aunt, John Barnes’s sister,
4Of course, there is never going to be only a single difference. For a discussion of this
point, see Lipton (2004, chapter 8).
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had died of cholera about a fortnight before. Since they had no children, her
apparel had been sent to John Barnes without having been cleaned before –
Barnes opened the box, fell sick, and then died.
As before, the miasma theory could not explain the two facts that (a) only
John Barnes and no one else contracted cholera in the first place, and (b)
that only those in contact with John Barnes went on to show symptoms
of the disease. If miasmas had been the cause of cholera, other people in
the village should have contracted cholera, not just John Barnes. The only
other option was for John Barnes and the others to have left the village
and been to a miasmatic region, but they were known not to have done
this. And, of course, once again, the incident makes much sense on Snow’s
communicability hypothesis, especially after the connection to Barnes’s dead
sister’s clothes is established. Again, in isolation these cases would not have
been meaningful, but Snow points out that there are far too many cases like
this to “be set down as mere coincidence” (MCP: 559a). And, once again,
we find him appealing to the causal principle that similar effects have similar
causes; only this time Snow spells out his reasoning for us explicitly: “And
if cholera be communicated in some instances, is there not the strongest
probability that it is so in the others – in short, that similar effects depend
on similar causes?” (MCC1: 30).
3.3 Water and the Broad Street pump
I also briefly want to discuss the Broad Street pump episode for which Snow
is now famous. Although the heroic story of Snow identifying the pump as
the culprit, it being closed, and the epidemic subsiding immediately is far
from the truth, there is a question of how Snow came to point his finger at the
pump. It should be noted that, by this time, Snow already suspected that
a water source was responsible for the outbreak.5 In the case of the Golden
Square outbreak, Snow was able to exclude the water companies; this left
him with the pumps. As a first step, Snow collected water from various
pumps and took it to a microscopist. However, besides general pollution,
the analysis didn’t show much. Even this was fairly important, however,
because it meant that the pump water was generally dirty and polluted, thus
also making it more likely for the cholera agent to be in the pump water,
5Most of the reasons for this involved complicated evidence comparing the water of
different London water suppliers.
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since Snow’s hypothesis was that it entered the pump water through people’s
evacuations. If the pump water had been found to be completely clean, it
would have been unclear how the agent could have contaminated the water
in the first place. Since examining the water turned out to be insufficient,
Snow turned to collecting data.
Looking at all the deaths from cholera, he realised that most of them were
close to the Broad Street pump. However, there were several ‘anomalies’,
areas where the mortality from cholera should have been high, but wasn’t.
This data seemed to disconfirm Snow’s theory, and there were two cases of
particular interest: the brewery and the workhouse, in both of which there
were virtually no deaths. Both of these were close to the pump, and, in the
case of the workhouse all of the exacerbating circumstances (according to
Snow) such as bad hygiene, lack of light, and overcrowding, were present, so,
according to Snow’s theory, the mortality rate there should’ve been high. It’s
clear how this was problematic for the miasma theory: the miasmas presum-
ably didn’t distinguish between those in the workhouse and the surrounding
streets, and both the brewery workers and the inhabitants of the workhouse
were thought to have low morals. But what about Snow? After making
enquiries, he found out that the inmates of the workhouse didn’t get their
water from the Broad Street pump. What about the brewery? The Board
of Health had in fact publicly advised people that alcohol was connected
to cholera, so again there was a problem for the miasma theory, since the
brewery workers should’ve been dying in large numbers. Once again, Snow
made enquiries. He called on the proprietor and was told that the brewery
obtained its water from the New River Company, and, in addition to this,
also had a deep well inside. However, more importantly, the proprietor also
pointed out that the workers were “allowed a certain quantity of malt liquor,
and Mr. Huggins believes they do not drink water at all” (MCC2).
Once again, we can see causal reasoning at work in Snow. Where earlier he
used the principle that similar effects have similar causes, he now appeals to
the principle that similar causes result in similar effects. This principle makes
him rule out miasmas in the Golden Square outbreak, since, if miasmas had
been the cause, the effects should’ve been similar – in our case this would
have entailed a fairly uniform distribution of cholera incidents all over the
affected neighbourhood, which was found not to be the case. Again, Snow
spells out his thought process explicitly:
I suspected some contamination of the water of the much-frequented
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street-pump in Broad Street, near the end of Cambridge Street; but
on examining the water, on the evening of the 3rd September, I found
so little impurity in it of an organic nature, that I hesitated to come
to a conclusion. Further inquiry, however, showed me that there was
no other circumstance or agent common to the circumscribed locality
in which this sudden increase of cholera occurred and not extending
beyond it, except the water of the above mentioned pump. (MCC2, my
emphasis)
Snow discounted miasmas precisely because they should have extended
beyond the area in question; however, they did not single out the affected
neighbourhood, as a true cause should have done.6 We can also see him
appealing to Mill’s Method of Difference again (cf. p. 7 above). Snow points
out that the only difference between those people who fell sick and those
who didn’t, is that the former group drank the pump water, with this being
corroborated especially by evidence arising from unexpected cases:
The result of the inquiry then was, that there had been no particular
outbreak or increase of cholera, in this part of London, except among
the persons who were in the habit of drinking water of the above-
mentioned [i.e. Broad Street] pump well. (MCC2, my emphasis)
Another principle that Snow uses at several points is probable reasoning.
The basic structure of this principle is to think about what the odds of some-
thing would have been against the present circumstances, if not for a certain
cause C. For example, he invokes something of this kind when talking about
the expected mortality rate in the workhouse and its unexpected lowness,
although there are many more cases. In MCC1, he concludes:
These opinions respecting the cause of cholera are brought forward,
not as matters of certainty, but as containing a greater amount of
probability in their favour than any other, in the present state of our
knowledge. (MCC1: 29).7
6Note how close this line of argument is to Mill’s Method of Agreement:“If two or more
instance of the phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common,
the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given
phenomenon” (214).
7It’s interesting to note that Snow’s reasoning at this point actually appears to be
an early version of the no-miracle argument, in thinking that the phenomena concerning
cholera would be a miracle unless his hypotheses were true.
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3.4 Snow and the traditional theoretical virtues
As we can see, there are several principles of reasoning at work in Snow’s case.
Snow is much concerned with explanatory considerations, a variety of causal
principles, and probable reasoning. I mentioned at the outset that I think
the case of Snow shows that we ought to consider certain principles, such as
the above, as excellent candidates for epistemic criteria besides the empirical
evidence. However, Snow’s case can actually also shed some light on some of
the more traditional theoretical virtues. Although Snow is less explicit about
these, I think it’s nevertheless worth mentioning how we can use his case not
just for checking whether certain rules are successful, but also for checking
whether some of the more traditional virtues play a role. Psillos’s list of
virtues included avoidance of ad hoc modifications, the generation of novel
predictions, and consilience, and it turns out that all of these are virtues that
Snow recognises as confirmatory.
3.4.1 Avoidance of ad hoc modifications
The idea behind this virtue is that, in the case of true theories, new (or
different) phenomena can be explained by elements already present in the
theory, without any need to introduce additional claims specifically designed
for the evidence in question but otherwise uncalled for. An example that
Snow cites in this context concerns the question of why Scotland was af-
flicted with cholera during winter, but not England. The miasma theory,
unsurprisingly, has nothing to say about this, and although it’s not imme-
diately obvious how Snow can account for this, it turns out that his theory
can account for what’s going on beautifully. Snow’s explanation is that the
English don’t drink much unboiled water, except when it’s warm, and that in
winter they drink mostly tea, coffee, and malt liquor. The Scottish, however,
use unboiled water all the time, either for mixing with whiskey, or if they
drink the whiskey straight, they often get thirsty afterwards, and drink large
quantities of water then, in this way constantly exposing themselves to the
cholera poison.
3.4.2 Generation of novel predictions
Snow predicted a whole host of new data that was found to actually be
the case. For example, he predicted a variety of statistical distributions,
the contamination of the pump, where there would and would not be high
11
mortality rates, that where the mortality rate was low, there were other water
sources, and so on. Although the events this data was based on had already
occurred they ought to nevertheless count as predictions: first of all, they are
the only kinds of prediction theories like his admit of, secondly, what seems
crucial is whether the predictions were already known to be the case or not,
not whether they had already obtained or not.
3.4.3 Consilience
The term consilience goes back to Whewell, who explains it this way:
[T]he evidence in favour of our induction is of a much higher and more
forcible character when it enables us to explain and determine [i.e.
predict] cases of a kind different from those which were contemplated
in the formation of our hypothesis. (1858: 87–88)
Snow’s theory also exhibits this criterion. Snow is able to explain a variety
of different classes of evidence (not all of which we could examine in detail,
unfortunately). To give a quick example, Snow could explain and determine
several kinds of statistics (such as the distribution of deaths during the Soho
outbreak, and certain numbers about the average populations and the du-
rations of epidemics) despite the fact that he did not initially use statistical
evidence in order to arrive at his hypothesis. Snow, in contrast to the miasma
theory, can explain completely different and independent kinds of evidence –
evidence from pathology, epidemiology, and statistics.8
4 The testability of epistemic significance
The point of the case of Snow then is to illustrate how we can test empirically
for the success of certain principles and rules. As it is only one case, it can
never establish the epistemic significance of any rule; however, it is exactly
the sort of case we require, and so provides an illustration of the kind of
data that we need in order to establish the epistemic significance of certain
practices (or any other non-empirical criteria). The case of Snow allows us to
see how we can use case-studies to check whether certain styles of reasoning
were successful: we can do so by examining certain principles, the conclusions
8Snow considers the statistical evidence a “circumstance strongly confirmatory of the
communication of cholera” (MCP: 559a).
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they lead to, and by determining whether or not the conclusions turned out
to be correct. Moreover, checking whether or not a certain state of affairs
obtained after it was predicted on the basis of a certain rule is an entirely
empirical undertaking. The case in this paper shows that (i) there are cases
where we can do this, and (ii) exactly what kind of analysis is required in
order to carry out this enterprise.
While not establishing epistemic significance, it shows us how we can do
so – by obtaining more data of the same kind. Consider what there is to
the epistemic significance of a certain rule (or any other criterion, for that
matter): what’s required is that using it leads to success, and failing to use
it doesn’t.9 This, however, is exactly what we can test for by using cases
of the above kind. One case does not establish the epistemic significance of
anything, but it is a piece of data that can either confirm or disconfirm the
entirely empirical hypothesis that a certain rule is truth-conducive.10
This means that the hypothesis of the epistemic significance of the criteria
themselves is empirically testable and admits of such testing in the same
way other empirical hypotheses do. In the usual scientific cases (or even
in ‘non-scientific’ everyday empirical cases) we begin with a small number
of instances, and, as time goes on and we collect more data, we find more
and more occurrences of the phenomenon, ending up with more and more
evidence, thereby increasing support for our hypothesis.
As more positive instances come to light, hypotheses get confirmed over
time (in the case in which they are supported, that is; obviously not in cases
where the hypothesis is a bad one – in fact, this is one of the factors that
distinguishes good from bad hypotheses). This also goes for our hypothe-
sis: what’s required to establish truth-conduciveness is a growing number of
cases where inferences were made on the basis of certain rules and practices
and where the inferred hypotheses are later confirmed, as is the case in the
example of Snow. As we examine cases in the history of science, we find
that certain rules and criteria are consistently and constantly successful. As
we gather more cases, we can then generate a robust and increasingly solid
9It’s sufficient for it to do so in sufficiently high proportions; after all, a rule like this
is supposed to be conducive to the truth, not guarantee it. For some objections related to
this, see section 5 below.
10Of course this leaves open some of the details as to what exactly is required in order to
establish epistemic significance, for example questions about how many cases are required,
and so on. I deal with these questions in section 5 when I discuss objections to this
approach.
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set of epistemic criteria that can guide us in theory-choice. Of course, it’s
still possible that I’m mistaken in thinking that the criteria mentioned above
actually are truth-conducive; that may be, but what counts is that – either
way – this is an empirical question that we can (and should) test.
5 Objections
One might have several objections to the project of showing that certain
inferential practices (or non-empirical criteria in general) are epistemically
significant. The first objection someone might voice is that there is no way of
knowing whether it’s not just a coincidence that the rules, in those particular
cases, led to the right conclusions. To illustrate this with an example: how
can this approach differentiate between ‘bogus’-rules and actual epistemically
significant rules? For example, it might be the case that we could successfully
use the rule ‘choose the theory that has the most anagrams of my name’ to
select a hypothesis that was later found to be true. Likely, this will be the
case for some theory and some name, but clearly we don’t want to call this
rule truth-conducive. But how do we know that our rule is not of the anagram
variety? For all we know, it could have been a mere coincidence that our rule
led to success. The way to show that more than coincidence is at work here
is through showing that there is a systematic correlation between the rules
and success. And the claim that there is such a correlation is an empirical
claim that is subject to testing and confirmation (or disconfirmation).
This brings us to a related objection. The problem is that no matter how
many cases we come up with, one can always argue that the (alleged) connec-
tion between the criterion and empirical success is a mere coincidence, and
not a sign of an actual and substantial connection. We might have simply ob-
served an unrepresentative subset of cases. This is true, of course, but, once
again, this is a general objection, not to our hypothesis about rules, but one
that can be voiced with respect to almost any hypothesis whose confirmation
depends on repeated occurrences. In that case, however, one is committed to
a fairly thorough-going scepticism about confirmation in general. Of course
there is no guarantee that we are observing representative subsets; in addi-
tion, there is always the possibility of coincidences or miracles. But taking
this route commits one to a scepticism that goes much beyond scepticism
about theoretical virtues and rules. Secondly, succumbing to this kind of
scepticism seriously thwarts the pursuit of the scientific enterprise. Scien-
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tific epistemology becomes impossible if one takes seriously the thought that
all of our best correlations, our cause- and effect-relationships, for example,
are coincidences. Doing scientific epistemology requires rejecting a certain
kind of academic scepticism. Note, by the way, that the same goes for our
everyday beliefs. As before, denying an epistemic connection between our
inferential practices and successful theories on the grounds that it might be
a coincidence (and given evidence to the contrary), on pain of consistency,
leads to the same results in cases of everyday reasoning. Thus, if in everyday
cases of reasoning about mundane objects, I infer certain claims, say when
I infer that I had a mouse in my apartment based on odd scratchy noises,
and the finding of mouse-droppings, who’s to say that the fact that I was
right (later confirmed by an actual sighting of the mouse) wasn’t just a coin-
cidence, and did not, in fact, have anything at all to do with my employing
a successful rule? However, if one rejects this argument in the case of mice,
one ought to also reject it in cases of scientific reasoning.
One might also object that, even granting that it’s possible in principle to
establish the general epistemic significance of certain rules, it will never be
possible to eliminate the possibility of coincidence in specific cases. For each
individual case, there is nothing that tells us whether it was, in fact, that rule
that was responsible for success, and whether it was really that rule that was
epistemically significant in that particular case (even if the rule in general is
known to be truth-conducive). This is true, but once again note that this
also goes for instances of everyday reasoning: it’s simply impossible to show,
for example, that certain causal principles connecting mouse-droppings to
mice were truth-conducive in the case of my mouse. Even if it’s true that the
underlying principle, in general, is taken to be a successful and epistemically
significant inferential practice, it’s not clear how one could ever show that
this particular inference to the mouse was based on it and epistemically
significant. The possibility still remains that success in this particular case
was a pure coincidence. Note, however, that this doesn’t undermine the
general truth-conduciveness of the rule, once established. While it might be
true that we will never be in a position to establish that specific rules were
responsible for success in particular cases, we can establish that a rule is
truth-conducive in general (and as a corollary, of course, making it more likely
that it was actually responsible for success in that case too, the probability of
this depending on the degree of truth-conduciveness of the rule). And that’s
all that’s required. What confirms our hypotheses are all the instances taken
together and not isolated occurrences, such a ‘global’ view being required in
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order to even make sense of the concept of truth-conduciveness.
Another objection goes like this: we have seen that Snow used a variety of
principles in arriving at his conclusions. One might think that this provides
additional material for an objection in the following sense: one might claim
that the fact that there are different rules at work in different cases means
that there is no guarantee that there will ever be any significant overlap
among the different cases and that this will prevent us from ever establishing
the truth-conduciveness of any of our practices and rules, since their use is
simply too isolated. There are several things to be said in reply here: the first
and most important one is that the ubiquity of the rules, just as everything
else, is an empirical matter. This means that we have to examine a number
of cases, discern what rules might have been in play, and see whether there
exists a general pattern (if we are unlucky, there will be no pattern at all).
However, once again, we don’t have to work blindly at this juncture. I suspect
that we will find more or less the same patterns and distributions of rules
that realists expect to find. And while this is, of course, merely speculation,
it can nevertheless provide a useful starting point for enquiry. Certain rules
will be more prevalent than others, certain other rules will apply only to
very specific circumstances and, as such, not always be applicable, and so
on. And while this is, ultimately, only a conjecture, it is a conjecture that can
be tested. And the very least that the case of Snow does is to be suggestive
of such connections.
Moreover, it is to be expected that we would find a variety of rules across
a variety of conditions, some more frequent than others, perhaps. And this
should not come as a surprise. Just as in cases of everyday reasoning, we
use different principles in different circumstances, this will also be the case
for scientific circumstances. The reason this is not surprising, is that certain
rules are simply not applicable in certain cases. Thus, for example, when I’m
wondering about why my white laundry came out pink, principles of statis-
tical reasoning simply aren’t relevant, whereas some sort of causal reasoning
involving a pair of red socks is. It might well turn out that certain practices
and rules are particularly prevalent in certain scenarios, and this suggests an
interesting agenda for future research. It would be useful to find out, first
of all, whether this is actually the case, and, if so, secondly, what rules are
prevalent in what kinds of cases. We might find, for example, that reasoning
by analogy plays a bigger role in reasoning in biology say, than in reasoning
in physics. If this were the case, and it could be shown that the various
sciences self-select to employ the principles most successful with respect to
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their specific kind of data, and most advantageous in reaching conclusions of
certain kinds, this would shed much light on the way in which scientists and
science proceed.
6 Underdetermination again
Let’s return to underdetermination. What’s the upshot of the Snow-case in
this context? It’s clear that, if we can establish the epistemic significance
of certain rules or other criteria besides the empirical evidence, we have a
way to break ties in underdetermination scenarios. In the case in which
empirical evidence was the only constraint on theory-choice, what was re-
quired of the anti-realist in order to establish underdetermination was only
empirical equivalence. Clearly, once other criteria come into play, what the
anti-realist would need to establish in order to establish underdetermination
is equivalence with respect to these additional criteria, in addition to empir-
ical equivalence. What’s more, it is not enough for the anti-realist to show
that there is sometimes epistemic equivalence of this kind; he needs to show
that this kind of epistemic equivalence always obtains.
However, the anti-realist might point out that all he needs to do in order
to establish this new underdetermination argument is to show that, in each
case in which a certain rule was used, there were other rules that would
have yielded the same hypothesis (these might even be rules traditionally
considered as non-epistemic, such as choosing hypotheses that are anagrams
of someone’s name, those selected on a specific date, etc.). Thus, the anti-
realist might claim that, because of these ‘rival’ rules the realist is forced
into a new underdetermination argument that he cannot escape. Should he
invoke further criteria, the anti-realist will do likewise, and so on.
However, while anti-realists might be able to show that there are other
rules which would have yielded the hypotheses in question, here’s what they
wouldn’t be able to show (or so I conjecture): that there is a ‘rival’ rule
that could have been used instead of the actual rule and that has been
empirically shown to be truth-conducive and successful over a variety of
cases and circumstances at different times. That is, they will not be able
to come up with a rival rule that has empirical support in the way that the
realist’s rule or set of rules has it.
Consider what exactly it is that the anti-realist would need to show. The
argument of this paper has been that there is a set of methodological practices
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and rules, members of which are routinely used to select certain scientific
hypotheses over others. What the anti-realist would need to show in order
to maintain a wholesale argument against underdetermination then is this:
that every possible theory could have been arrived at by such a rival rule.
And in order to do this, he would have to show one of the following two:
1. either that there is a rival set of practices and that, for every theory,
it is possible to select an empirically equivalent, logically incompatible
rival theory by means of members/rules from that set,
2. or, that for every theory, selected by members of the epistemologically
significant set, there exists a rival theory that is empirically equivalent
to T, logically incompatible with it, and that was also selected by dif-
ferent members or different combinations of members from that same
set.
And it is extremely hard to see how this would be possible. But notice
that even if it was possible to show that there is a rival selection mechanism
for each individual case (which is already highly doubtful, to my mind),
what’s almost impossible to see is how this could possibly be established in
advance by means of a general argument. In the case of empirically equivalent
theories, this was always possible by appealing to sceptical hypotheses, but
this course is no longer available.
In fact, there are two requirements for the anti-realist that make it hard
to see how he could ever produce the required rival rules: (i) first of all, he
needs to come up with a rival set that applies to any (possible, future) theory
whatsoever (just as, in the standard underdetermination scenario, he needed
a way to generate empirically equivalent rivals to any theory whatsoever),
(ii) secondly, he needs a way to generate such a rival set for any theory what-
soever: he needs an algorithm for doing this. Why the second requirement?
The point is that, absent an algorithm to generate such rivals, anti-realists
would need to generate their rivals on a case to case basis. And while we
might be able to see how this could be accomplished, this is not enough for
the anti-realist. As soon as he makes the move to producing rival theories
case by case, he loses the guarantee that there will always be some rival
equivalent both empirically and with respect to the rules. But it is precisely
this guarantee that is required in order for the anti-realist to pull through his
wholesale argument against realism. Absent any mechanism for producing
rivals to the rules, the realist can always argue that it’s possible for the rules
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to actually break the tie, and this, as we have seen, is already enough to
undermine the general anti-realist conclusion. Thus, while we can see how
to establish equivalence by means of algorithms in the case of evidence, it is
not at all clear how to do this in the case of epistemically significant rules.
Another difference is this: realists, at this point, have not completely estab-
lished the set of epistemically significant methodological rules and practices,
but as more data comes in, the set solidifies to the extent that we are increas-
ingly able to capture what its members are. In that sense, we can predict,
that in the next successful case, certain members of that set will be used.
This is where an additional problem for the anti-realist comes in — he can-
not tell us in advance what the members of the rival set would be. He might
resort to claim, for example, that there is a weird disjunctive set of rival
practices (anagrams or a specific date or the shortest or the easiest to pro-
nounce or . . . and so on). But in that case, he will never be able to obtain
the complete set until the end of the universe, or until the last theory is ever
proposed, and it’s unclear in what sense it’s then a rival set. It’s certainly
not rival in the sense that the members of that set have been well tested over
long periods of time. This last option will be unavailable in the disjunctive
case. And note, by the way, that a similar argument is possible with respect
to any other criterion that might be established as epistemically significant.
However, it’s also important to note the limitations of this argument. Pro-
viding an argument establishing the (possible) epistemic significance of our
methodological rules and practices, and showing that these rules can, in prin-
ciple, function as epistemic tie-breakers, does not in fact solve the problem
of underdetermination or even preclude its possibility. Even if the rules can
break the ties in some cases, this does not mean that they can break the
ties in all cases. There are different reasons for this: firstly, there might be
underdetermination with respect to them, and secondly, we might simply not
know how to use them as tie-breakers in particular cases, even though there
might be an answer. Again note, however, that this will be the case for any
criterion whatsoever that the realist puts forward. If the realist can show,
for any criterion C, that it is epistemically relevant or significant, there is al-
ways the possibility that theories might tie with respect to it, whatever C is.
The relevant question then centres on the sense of ‘possibility’ that’s at play
here. It is certainly the case that, no matter what C is, there will always be
the logical possibility of underdetermination. This means that no argument
that establishes the epistemic significance of any criterion will ever be able
to show that underdetermination is no longer possible. However, depending
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on the criterion in question, what it might do, is significantly narrow the
possibilities under which underdetermination can obtain.
What this discussion brings out, on a more general level, is that realists
and anti-realists pursue different aims: anti-realists want to establish that
underdetermination is always possible, and realists want to show that under-
determination is rare, but, of course, they want to leave open its possibility.
Put another way, realists aren’t interested in showing that underdetermina-
tion is never possible, since, they think, the question of whether there ever
is underdetermination or not is empirical. As such, any attempt to try to
show that underdetermination is either always or never possible is misguided.
What the case of the rules – and the debate about theoretical virtues in gen-
eral – shows, is that establishing their epistemic significance will never be
sufficient to completely rule out arguments from underdetermination, since a
new kind of underdetermination with respect to the rules is always possible.
However, it also makes it hard to see how anti-realists could ever establish
a revised in-principle underdetermination argument that takes such criteria
into account – but this is exactly what is required of anti-realists, if they wish
underdetermination to remain their wholesale argument against realism.
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